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Tort Law for Cynics 
Dan Priel* 
Abstract. Various tort scholars have in recent years come to the defence of a ‘traditional’ or ‘idealist’ view of tort 
law. In the context of negligence this view implies that having a duty of care means that the law considers violating 
this duty as something that the duty-holder must make an effort not to do. Idealists contrast this view with a 
‘cynical’ view according to which having a duty of care implies a legal requirement to pay damages for breach of 
the duty of care. In this essay I defend the cynical view against its critics. Descriptively, I argue that the cynical 
view can easily explain doctrines supposedly only explicable from an idealist perspective, and that in fact many 
aspects of tort law are hard to reconcile with idealism. I argue that various empirical constraints often make 
idealism, even if it were desirable, unattainable, and in this regard cynicism is a more honest view than idealism. 
But I further argue that cynicism is not merely a concession to reality, that idealism is often undesirable. Idealists 
ignore the fact that opting for idealism has costs (both pecuniary and non-pecuniary), and that when those are taken 
into account, idealism is often normatively unattractive.  
Introduction 
Back in 1949 Lord Justice Denning had an occasion to consider the rules imposing tort liability on 
the actions of people of unsound mind. He wrote there:  
I am aware that these rules of law have been criticized by some jurists who would make…liability in tort 
depend on blameworthiness, but I venture to think that this criticism is somewhat out of date. Recent 
legislative and judicial developments show that the criterion of liability in tort is not so much culpability, but 
on whom should the risk fall.1 
In recent years this ‘out of date’ view has been making something of a comeback. A recent spate of 
writings has asked us to ‘rediscover’ negligence law which ‘has been forgotten’,2 to return it to its 
‘traditional’ roots, to go back to views that ‘until about 40 years ago…had always’ been accepted 
and according to which ‘tort law is all about protecting people who had suffered a wrong, people 
whose rights had been violated’.3 In this essay I wish to challenge one aspect of this new-old view, 
namely the nature and role of duty of care in the tort of negligence.  
In an essay published a few years ago Nicholas McBride vigorously defended what he called 
an ‘idealist’ view that affirms the existence of duties of care, against what he called the ‘cynical’ 
* Associate Professor, Osgood Hall Law School, York University. An earlier version of this paper was presented at
the LSE, and I thank participants there for their comments and questions. I also thank Vincent Chiao, Chris Essert, David 
Howarth, and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments. Their comments have led to many changes, large and 
small, to the essay. 
1 White v White, [1950] P 39, 58–59. Denning held on to these views. See Spartan Steel v Martin & Co [1973] 1 QB 
27, 37; Lamb v Camden London Borough Council [1981] 1 QB 625, 634, 636–637. 
2 See A. Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (Oxford: Hart, 2007) 512. 
3 N.J. McBride & R. Bagshaw, Tort Law (Harlow: Pearson Longman, 3rd ed, 2008) xiv (hereinafter McBride & 
Bagshaw (3rd ed)). The historical claim is unfounded. See notes 33, 92. Here and below I cite from the last two editions of 
this book, the last one being N.J. McBride & R. Bagshaw, Tort Law (Harlow: Pearson, 4th ed, 2012) (hereinafter 
McBride & Bagshaw (4th ed)). Since my discussion seeks to challenge a view rather than a particular book, and since, as 
far as I can tell, the authors have not changed their views on tort law, I believe this usage is justified. Another scholar 
espousing this view is R. Stevens, Torts and Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). In the US John Goldberg 
and Benjamin Zipursky have defended this view in many (joint and several) writings. See in particular J.C.P. Goldberg & 
B.C. Zipursky, ‘The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law’ (2001) 54 Vand L Rev 657; J.C.P. 
Goldberg & B.C. Zipursky, ‘The Moral of MacPherson’ (1998) 146 U Pa L Rev 1733; J.C.P. Goldberg & B.C. Zipursky, 
‘Torts as Wrongs’ (2010) 88 Tex L Rev 917. 
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position that denies their existence.4 Not only do duties of care exist, McBride insisted that every one 
of us has ‘millions’ of them.5 Along similar lines, John Goldberg and Benjamin Zipursky have 
defended an ‘anti-reductionist’ view of tort law according to which there are special relations in the 
interactions of ‘manufacturer–consumer, business–business, business–customer, doctor–patient, 
lawyer–client,…landlord–tenant, host–guest’, and  that ‘there is no reason to suppose that these 
diverse norms are really just expressions of a deeper reality’ such as individuals’ ‘capacities as 
autonomous, self-interested agents or citizens of a polity subject to regulation’.6 Pushing this idea to 
its logical conclusion Robert Stevens has argued that we should stop speaking not just of ‘tort law’ 
as though it reflected a unified ground for liability, but even of ‘the tort of negligence’.7 
McBride’s essay prompted a response from David Howarth.8 While agreeing with McBride 
that the cynic’s position is ‘clearly untenable’,9 he favoured the view which McBride dubbed ‘ultra-
idealism’ and hastily dismissed as a view ‘no serious lawyer would nowadays endorse’.10 As 
Howarth defined it, this ultra-idealist view is ‘that there is only one duty of care—a duty not to 
harm others by faulty conduct’.11 The purpose of this essay is to say something in support of the 
view both McBride and Howarth rejected. Even though McBride’s labels could hardly have been 
more partisan (‘duty nominalism’ or ‘duty minimalism’ would have been more neutral alternatives), 
I have decided to stick to his terminology and make the case for the cynical approach to tort law, and 
especially negligence. That may not seem like a very promising endeavour; it is tempting to agree 
with Howarth that at least in the English context, the cynical view cannot be true because of the 
central place duty of care plays in negligence liability. At least since Donoghue v Stevenson,12 courts 
have on many occasions dismissed a negligence claim on the basis of a finding of no duty of care, 
and that seems difficult to reconcile with the cynical view.  
Despite such an unpromising starting point, I will try to show that this fact (which I do not 
dispute) is not enough to dispose of duty cynicism. One aim of this essay is to present a clearer and 
fairer picture of this view, one that corresponds to views actually held by certain people. I hope to 
show that tort cynicism, or at least a version of it, is far more powerful a position than presented by 
its critics. To that end I begin by presenting what is at stake between idealism, ultra-idealism, and 
cynicism. I then turn in section II to evaluating arguments put forward by McBride and others 
against cynicism and argue that they are unconvincing and that some of them actually support the 
cynical view. In section III, I outline some of the positive reasons in favour of cynicism. I conclude in 
section IV by explaining the practical significance of the debate. 
                                                                   
4 N.J. McBride, ‘Duties of Care—Do They Really Exist?’ (2004) 24 OJLS 417; cf R. Stevens, ‘Torts’ in L. Blom-
Cooper et al (eds), The Judicial House of Lords: 1876–2009 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) 629, 652 (‘The Law 
itself is compromised if a cynical or ‘realist’ view is allowed to take hold’). 
5 McBride, n 4 above, 432. 
6 J.C.P. Goldberg & B.C. Zipursky, ‘Accidents of the Great Society’ (2005) 64 Md L Rev 364, 389–390. 
7 Stevens, n 3 above, 291–292, 301–303.  
8 D. Howarth, ‘Many Duties of Care—Or a Duty of Care? Notes from the Underground’ (2006) 26 OJLS 449. 
9 Ibid 450. 
10 McBride, n 4 above, 437.  
11 Howarth, n 8 above, 450. 
12 [1932] AC 562.  
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I. Idealism, Ultra-Idealism, and Cynicism 
With the story about medieval scholars concerned with the number of angels who can dance on a pin 
probably a myth,13 concern with the number of duties of care people have may seem like a good real-
life example of a pointless academic debate. How are we to tell whether there are many duties of 
care, just one, or none at all? Why does it even matter? The duties in question are, as idealists 
themselves claim, legal duties, not moral ones;14 and as law is a human creation, the answer to this 
question should not depend on what we have ‘reason to suppose’,15 but on what people think about 
the matter. And since most people, including most lawyers, have not thought about the matter at all, 
it is tempting to reply that the number of duties of care is not a matter susceptible to any determinate 
answer.16 Or we might say that from one perspective the duty of, for instance, an employer to her 
employees is distinct from the duty a driver owes to pedestrians; and from another perspective, we 
can see them as reflecting different instantiations of one general duty. There is no logical basis for 
deciding between the two views, and it looks as though little hangs on deciding one way or the other. 
But the life of the law has not been logic, and experience tells us that the distinction may have 
practical effects. To idealists, Lord Atkin’s words that ‘in English law there must be, and is, some 
general conception of relations giving rise to a duty of care, of which the particular cases found in the 
books are but instances’,17 bolstered later by Lord Reid’s statement in Dorset Yacht that Lord 
Atkin’s neighbour principle ‘ought to apply unless there is some justification or valid explanation for 
its exclusion’18 are dangerous. A general duty of care may encourage courts to think that one needs 
to find reasons not to apply it to novel situations.19 By contrast, when the different duties found in 
particular relations are not thought to reflect a more general duty, courts may find it more difficult to 
infer the existence of a duty of care in novel cases. Add to this the injunction to develop the law 
‘incrementally and by analogy with recognized categories’,20 and the practical effect of the many-
duties view is likely to be narrower liability in negligence.  
As the scope of negligence liability has distributive effects, I believe this debate has a political 
undercurrent,21 but I will not explore this issue here. Instead, I will focus on other questions raised by 
the competing views. Many defenders of idealism seem to favour it because they wish to limit the 
                                                                   
13 See E.D. Sylla, ‘Sweter Katrei and Gregory of Rimini: Angels, God, and Mathematics in the Fourteenth Century’ 
in T. Koestier & L. Bergmans (eds), Mathematics and the Divine: A Historical Study (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 2005) 249, 
251–256. 
14 McBride, n 4 above, 417 note 1; Goldberg & Zipursky, ‘Torts as Wrongs’, n 3 above, 919; J.C.P. Goldberg & 
B.C. Zipursky, ‘Seeing Tort Law from the Internal Point of View: Holmes and Hart on Legal Duties’ (2006) 75 Fordham L 
Rev 1563, 1580–1581. 
15 See the quoted text accompanying note 6. 
16 Cf D. Priel, ‘The Boundaries of Law and the Purpose of Legal Philosophy’ (2008) 27 L & Phil 643, 656–661. 
17 Donoghue, n 12 above, 580. Lord Atkin’s warning ‘against the danger of stating propositions of law in wider 
terms than is necessary’, ibid 584, has received less attention. 
18 Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004, 1027. Denning provided an early statement of this idea 
when, already in 1949, he said that Lord Atkin in Donoghue ‘implicitly adopted’ the principle that ‘all injuries done by one 
person are actionable unless there is some justification recognised by law’. Lord Justice Denning, ‘The Universities and 
Law Reform’ (1949) 1 JSPTL 258, 263. 
19 One tort idealist called this the ‘disaster’ of Anns v Merton London Borough Council [1978] AC 728. See Stevens, 
n 4 above, 637. 
20 Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 AC 398, 461, following Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman 
(1985) 157 CLR 424, 481. 
21 See D. Priel, ‘Torts, Rights, and Right-Wing Ideology’ (2011) 19 Torts LJ 1. In the exchange between McBride 
and Howarth the political lines are not difficult to see. Howarth’s political views are known. For McBride’s, see the 
sources cited in McBride, n 4 above, 440–441, notes 81–85.  
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role of policy in tort law and they believe that one could glean our reciprocal rights and obligations to 
each other when the question of duty of care is analysed at the level of fairly narrow categories like 
doctor and patient. By contrast, because of its generality the ultra-idealist view almost inevitably 
requires appeal to policy in addressing the question of duty of care in particular cases. Those who 
think that courts should refrain from relying on policy are therefore typically unsympathetic to 
attempts to unify tort (or negligence) law under one general principle. Those who want courts to take 
such considerations into account are more likely to favour seeing the different duties converging into 
one. Thus, even without appealing to left- or right-wing politics, what emerges is that at stake 
here—masquerading as conceptual claims about what tort law ‘is’—are subtle normative 
arguments on what shape the law should take, how far should negligence protection extend, and 
how judges should decide cases. 
If this is true, then, contrary to what the labels might suggest, ultra-idealism turns out to be 
much closer to the cynical view than the idealist view. From the view that ‘[e]veryone owes to the 
world at large the duty of refraining from those acts that may unreasonably threaten the safety of 
others’,22 it is but a small step to the cynical view that the duty concept is an unnecessary ‘fifth 
wheel’,23 that it plays no real role in determining whether liability should be imposed. The cynic can 
readily accept that courts sometimes make categorical decisions on whether tort liability should be 
imposed in certain types of events and will not be particularly troubled if these determinations are 
labelled ‘duty of care’. But she will insist that the concept of ‘duty’ is not likely to play any 
determinative role in these categorical determinations. On this I think the cynic and the ultra-idealist 
will hold similar views, which is why many of those McBride classified as ultra-idealists could just 
as well be described as cynics.24  
I therefore agree with McBride that the real stakes are between the idealists and the cynics, not 
between the idealists and ultra-idealists. However, McBride and other idealists are not sufficiently 
precise in their characterisation of idealism and therefore in explaining what is at stake between 
them and the cynics. There are in fact two related but distinct views under the umbrella of ‘idealism’. 
One view, which may be called ‘generation-idealism’, claims that it is only by analysing individuals’ 
rights and duties that we should understand the scope of tort liability. Proponents of generation-
idealism will thus deny any role for policy considerations, by which I mean broad societal 
considerations and in particular considerations pertaining to the potential consequences of decisions 
one way or the other.25 For them the question of duty of care amounts to the question of what we owe 
to each other, a question they believe can be answered by an assessment of our interpersonal 
relationships without any appeal to present social context or the possible future effects of deciding 
the matter one way or the other. A second type of idealism may be called ‘implications-idealism’. 
                                                                   
22 Palsgraf v Long Island Railroad Company (1928) 162 NE 99, 103 (Andrews J, dissenting), quoted in McBride, n 4 
above, 436 n 64, as an example of ultra-idealism. 
23 W.W. Buckland, ‘The Duty to Take Care’ (1935) 51 LQR 637, 639; see also P.H. Winfield, ‘Duty in Tortious 
Negligence’ (1934) 34 Colum L Rev 41, 61–65. 
24 Howarth himself is not far from cynicism when he says that ‘negligence law deals not in rights to compensation 
but in judging the reasonableness of conduct’. Howarth, n 8 above, 472. For completeness’s sake I should mention that 
there are scholars who expressed views that somewhat resemble ultra-idealism, but will (correctly) deny that their view is 
close to cynicism. See Beever, n 2 above, 122–123. I cannot address Beever’s views here, but it is notable that in his view 
‘[t]he task of legal principle is to discover the conceptual boundaries of liability’. Ibid 122. This is different from 
answering specific questions on liability in particular cases.  
25 Generation-idealism comes in both idealist and ultra-idealist versions. For the former see e.g. Stevens, n 3 above, 
passim, especially ch 14; for the latter see e.g. E.J. Weinrib, Corrective Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) ch 
2. 
5 
 
This view accepts that the determination of what legal rights and duties we have cannot be 
determined purely ‘internally’ by an assessment of interpersonal relationships on their own; 
nonetheless, this view insists that once a legal duty has been recognised we can draw from that 
certain conceptual implications about what that duty requires and how those subject to it should act. 
As far as I can tell, all generation-idealists are also implication-idealists, but not the reverse. Thus, 
for instance, in their defences of idealism Goldberg, Zipursky and McBride give room for policy in 
determining (or at least limiting) duties of care,26 and their arguments against cynicism mostly 
purport to show only the superiority of implications-idealism to cynicism.  
Against this, cynicism (as I understand it) stands for the rejection of both idealist claims. It 
recognises that the law creates categories of no-liability, but that these determinations are (and 
should be) based on analysis of the social impact of such determinations. It further argues that as a 
matter of fact negligence law does not always (of even often) treat violations of duties of care as 
behaviours that should be avoided, but rather as behaviours for which one should pay damages; 
even more contentiously, it argues that there are good reasons for that. 
As generation-idealism is the stronger view, all criticism of implications-idealism will apply to 
the former view as well. For this reason, and because of limits of space, I will largely confine myself 
here to implications-idealism, but it is important to note the connection between the two. Much of the 
appeal of idealism comes from the fact that it posits that tort law deals with ‘wrongs’, and that 
therefore violating tort law duties is wrong and therefore something one should refrain from doing. 
There is, however, one great difficulty with this story and it is that the wrongs in question are 
described by idealists themselves as legal wrongs, not moral ones.27 If that is the case, one needs 
further argument for the move from the idea that tort law deals with wrongs to the conclusion that 
they should not be violated. Cynics may accept that what tort law protects can be, and often is, 
called ‘legal rights’ and when those are violated one commits a ‘legal wrong’. What they deny is the 
immediate analogy between legal and moral wrongs in terms of what they require. Here, Holmes’s 
warning from more than a century ago of the potential for confusion due to the similarity between 
legal and moral language, is particularly apt:28 It may be that to think of a duty as something one 
should try to never breach is uncontroversial in the context of moral rights and duties, but one 
cannot both insist that the rights and duties in question are legal (and as such distinct from moral 
rights and duties) and rely on the fact that both are called ‘wrongs’ to draw the conclusion that, like 
moral wrongs, legal wrongs should not be violated.29  
                                                                   
26 See Goldberg & Zipursky, ‘The Moral of MacPherson’, n 3 above, 1842 n 418; McBride & Bagshaw (4th ed), n 3 
above, 103. In both sources the authors argue that policy should only be used to deny duty of care, but never to recognise 
it. They do not explain why. 
27 See note 14. 
28 O.W. Holmes, ‘The Path of the Law’ (1897) 10 Harv L Rev 457, 458–462. 
29 Goldberg & Zipursky, n 14 above, 1575–1577, building on Hart’s distinction between ‘being obliged’ and ‘being 
under an obligation’ argue that what is true of moral obligation is true of legal obligation as well. There are three 
problems with this argument. First and least important, in the same place Hart develops his ideas Hart expounds a public 
law view of private law: he talks of ‘civil law’ duties as ‘entrusted by the group to a private individual’. H.L.A. Hart, The 
Concept of Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2012) 87. Second, Hart’s linguistic distinction is relevant to 
social obligations, which are ‘valid’ only so long as they are followed; on the other hand, legal obligations in the Hartian 
framework are valid even if not followed at all. It is therefore a mistake to use Hart’s linguistic point (developed in the 
context of social duties) for an analysis of legal duties when they are different on a matter so central to the question under 
consideration. Third and most important, Hart’s theory is completely oblivious to the type of legal rules we now call 
‘regulation’. Much of modern regulation acts not through ‘thou shalt not’s but through incentives (‘nudges’), which are 
not easily incorporated into Hart’s typology of rules. One may thus admit that Hart’s account is correct as far as it goes, 
but that it is incomplete as it does not consider what we may call ‘incentivising rules’. (One possible way of incorporating 
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To support the claim for a similarity between moral and legal duties on this score, one might 
argue that though legal duties are distinct from moral duties, all tort legal duties are also moral 
duties.30 For this claim to have any relevance in this context it has to be the case that the identity is 
not coincidental but conceptual, that tort law can only be concerned with moral rights. Leaving aside 
sceptical questions about the existence or nature of moral rights, this is an odd claim: first, this view 
implies that there is a supra-constitutional limit on lawmakers’ ability to determine the content of 
tort law. Second, on the reasonably assumption that morality consists not just of rights, it is unclear 
why tort law as a conceptual matter is only concerned with that part of morality (and cannot also be 
concerned with promoting non-rights-based moral goals). Even then, i.e. even if tort law is 
exclusively in the business of enforcing pre-existing moral rights, it is unclear whether the desired 
conclusion follows. It may be that morality demands that people fulfil all their moral duties 
(although familiar examples about justified breaches of promises or justified lies suggest that even 
within morality the picture is more complex). It is still the case that because of various competing 
institutional or moral constraints that law must take into account, the meaning of legal duties is 
different the meaning of moral ones.  
To say that tort law is concerned with ‘legal duties’ thus leaves open the question of what those 
duties require, and the rest of the essay is an attempt to answer it. Before proceeding to my answer, I 
must briefly address a preliminary methodological question, namely how this question is to be 
answered. To the extent that we are trying to say something about tort law as it is, the answer must 
be based on examining it in practice, not by divining abstract conceptual truths. Even when 
examining the practice, however, I suggest we look more at what the law does rather than what it 
says. By speaking of what the law does, I refer to the real-world consequences of the workings of 
legal institutions.31 What ‘the law says’, on the other hand, is often (and especially so in the context 
of tort law) just shorthand for what certain judges have written in their judicial opinions. While not 
insignificant, judges have an almost free hand to write what they want in their opinions with most 
constraints self-imposed and reputational rather than controlled or edited from the outside. It is thus 
unsurprising that we can find judicial statements going in different directions, including some (as 
the quote from Denning at the beginning of this essay demonstrates) clearly cynical ones.  
Examining such pronouncements is thus significant because they provide evidence on the 
attitudes of some of those engaged in the practice; such pronouncements may also have influence 
others, and so help push a legal doctrine in one direction rather than another. Nevertheless, the 
ultimate test is what legal systems ‘do’, i.e. the actual effects of judicial decisions. We do not judge 
people who talk idealistically but act cynically as idealists; we think of them as cynics (and 
hypocrites as well). In this regard, the law is the same.  
The following sections therefore attempt to look at what the law does. I first examine closely 
various legal doctrines that have been said to show that tort law is best understood in idealist terms 
and I show that none of them supports this claim. I then turn to a more positive case for cynicism. I 
first argue that there are numerous doctrines that show that the law in fact adopts the cynical view. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
such rules within Hart’s framework is in terms of a disjunctive obligation to either act in a certain way or pay damages.) 
When this sort of rule is acknowledged, the cynic can argue that these days tort law is made up (in whole or in part) of 
incentivising rules. 
30 Cf Blackburn, Low & Co v Vigors (1886) 17 QBD 553, 558, where Lord Esher MR said: ‘every general 
proposition laid down by judges, as a principle of law, as distinguished from an enactment by statute, is the statement of 
some ethical principle of rights and wrong applied to circumstances arising in real life’. 
31 On this I am in agreement with McBride: ‘there is…no point in discussing whether the cynics or idealists are 
right if it does not actually make a difference who is right’. McBride, n 4 above, 419. 
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This leaves it open to argue that despite all this, it would be better for the legal system to become 
more idealistic. I then take up that question and explain why tort cynicism may be a good thing. 
II. What the Cynical View Can(not) Explain 
So far I have suggested that a defender of implications-idealism must either also defend generation-
idealism (and address the difficulties with this view, not least of which is that it does not seem to 
correspond with what the courts are doing), or provide an argument to explain why we should 
understand the implications of legal rights to be similar to the implications of moral rights. The 
defenders of idealism I consider below have adopted a third strategy. They seek to show that more 
than any other competing account, implications-idealism comports with legal practice. In this 
respect their willingness to countenance policy considerations in the determination of duty of care 
(i.e. their rejection of generation-idealism and willingness to limit themselves to implications-
idealism), may reflect their recognition of the courts’ syncretism, a position that the more purist 
generation-idealist would reject.  
While this approach by itself does not amount to a normative argument in favour of 
implications-idealism, if the claims of its defenders are true, they constitute a significant finding 
about positive law that is also of normative significance. The burden of this section is to show that 
the claims of idealists about the shortcomings of cynicism are unconvincing. I hope to show that 
none of the examples adduced in support of implications-idealism support it, and that some of them 
are actually an embarrassment for the implications-idealist. 
Punitive Damages. McBride claims that the cynical view cannot explain the fact that punitive 
damages are awarded in some common law jurisdictions against those who commit torts. His 
argument here runs as follows: he first claims that only the idealist view can explain punitive 
damages, and then seeks to show that English tort law is premised on idealism despite the fact that 
punitive damages are largely unknown in English tort law. How so? McBride answers that punitive 
damages are part of American tort law and that ‘it would be strange if there existed such a 
fundamental divide between England and the other common law jurisdictions that duties of care 
actually existed in those other jurisdictions, but not in England. When did the divide arise? And 
how?’32  
As arguments go, this one is rather odd. It seeks to tell us something about the nature of 
English tort law by appealing to a doctrine that is not part of it. This might be thought enough to set 
this argument aside, but let us probe it a bit more to see what it presupposes. First, the suggestion 
that one can learn something about English tort law on the basis of a doctrine found in another legal 
system just because they both belong to the ‘common law’ can only make sense if we assume that all 
common law systems share some fundamental principles. McBride clearly thinks that non-common 
law jurisdictions follow a different philosophy, which is why he objects to French law influences on 
English law.33 He therefore disapproves of the idea of a ‘common law of Europe’34 but endorses the 
                                                                   
32 Ibid 426. 
33 Ibid 439–440. McBride suggests there that the popularity of tort cynicism is in part a consequence of the influence 
of French law. I do not know of a single tort cynic in the common law world who based his views on French law. Perhaps 
this is because the rights-based conception of tort law favoured by McBride has actually come to the common law from 
civil law. See J. Gordley, ‘The Common Law in the Twentieth Century: Some Unfinished Business’ (2000) 88 Cal L Rev 
1815, 1823 (‘The civil law approach…says [tort] liability depends on whether the plaintiff has been harmed in violation of 
his rights’). It is actually the common law where the claims we now classify as ‘torts’ historically had nothing to do with a 
violation of right. Ibid 1823–1824. 
34 McBride, n 4 above, 439. 
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common law of the entire common law world, even though the UK has formal political ties with 
other European nations (including France), but none with the United States. More importantly, his 
rejection of French law influences shows that his argument for idealism does not rest on some 
universalistic idea of tort law. By insisting on the difference between English and French tort law he 
acknowledges that it is possible to have a coherent albeit different conception of tort law. But if that 
is the case, it is hard to see the basis for assuming (rather than showing) that all common law 
jurisdictions, despite clear political and cultural differences, must have the same underlying 
philosophy for their law of torts.35 Less abstractly, there is in fact no difficulty whatsoever in 
answering the questions McBride posed. American law is part of the American polity and exists in 
the environment of American social and political culture, which is quite different from the British 
one. These differences have shaped English and American tort law in different ways. Three of those 
ways which are particularly relevant in this context are the widespread (but not universal) rejection 
among American lawyers of the idea that there is a distinct area of law called ‘private law’;36 the idea 
that any part of American law should be considered as belonging to some abstract supranational 
legal system of the kind McBride imagines; and closer to the issue at hand, the enormous influence 
of economic analysis of law on American law. Since economic-influenced scholarship on tort law is 
quite thoroughly and unabashedly cynical, an American shift towards cynicism is not difficult to 
explain.37 
These differences are implicitly acknowledged by Commonwealth lawyers who discuss 
American tort cases and scholarship much less frequently than they do cases and scholarship from 
other common law jurisdictions (and not for lack of either). McBride’s reliance on American law in 
this context is particularly odd, given the widely (though not universally) received view that duty of 
care has, at best, a minimal role in most negligence claims in American law! In an essay written 
twenty five years ago (an essay that concluded that the differences between English and American 
tort law are ‘great’), Patrick Atiyah wrote that in American courts ‘the law of negligence began to 
expand dramatically’ as ‘limits on the duty of care were swept aside as archaic nonsense’.38 More 
recently this impression was confirmed in what may be the most authoritative account of American 
tort law, the third Restatement on tort, in which duty is relegated to the kind of filter mechanism that 
can be used to limit liability, not a positive requirement for imposing liability.39 As Stephen Perry 
succinctly summarised the American position, ‘[f]or all intents and purposes, modern American tort 
                                                                   
35 On the political assumptions underlying this view (assumptions that are largely not shared by Americans) see D. 
Priel, ‘The Law and Politics of Unjust Enrichment’ (2013) 63 U Toronto LJ 533, 553–556. Based on this I argue there that 
on many private law issues English law is now much closer to European civil law countries than to American common 
law. See ibid 568–569. 
36 This is the traditional attitude of English law as well. But recently the (ironically) civilian distinction between 
private and public law has garnered support in England. See D. Priel, ‘The Political Origins of English Private Law’ 
(2013) 40 JL & Soc 481. 
37 For more detailed historical accounts of the development of twentieth century tort law and tort scholarship in the 
US that answer McBride’s queries see G.E. White, Tort Law in America: An Intellectual History (New York: Oxford 
University Press, expanded ed, 2003); G.L. Priest, ‘The Invention of Enterprise Liability: A Critical History of the 
Intellectual Foundations of Modern Tort Law’ (1985) 14 J Legal Stud 461 (emphasising the influence of Fleming James); 
Goldberg & Zipursky, ‘The Moral of MacPherson’, n 3 above, 1752–1777 (emphasising the significance of Holmes and 
Prosser). 
38 P.S. Atiyah, ‘American Tort Law in Crisis’ (1987) 7 OJLS 279, 291–292 & n 24.  
39 See Restatement of the Law, Third, Torts: General Principles: Liability for Physical Harm (2010) §§6–7, and in 
particular the numerous cases discussed in ibid 84–88. These confirm that as far as physical harm goes American law, at 
best, adopts the ultra-idealist view, which as explained earlier, is not very different from the cynical view.  
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law has abandoned [the] traditional understanding of the duty of care’.40 Of course, to speak of 
‘American’ law in this context may be a bit misleading, as each state has its own tort law and there 
are differences among them; but Perry seems to present the prevailing understanding in American 
law. At least in California, the US’s most populous state (and one whose state courts have often 
influenced other states), one easily find there judicial statements that are unquestionably cynical.41 
When we turn to the specific point McBride raises—punitive damages—a New York Times 
article that was part of a series on what might be called American legal exceptionalism pointed out 
that ‘[d]istinctive features of the American legal system—civil juries, class actions, contingency fees 
and the requirement that each side bear its own lawyers’ fees—all play a role in amplifying punitive 
damages’.42 It is these features (largely absent from English tort law), that explain why punitive 
damages are frequent in American law, not American courts’ supposed commitment to idealism. 
Consequently, punitive damages are more common in American law across the board, not just in 
tort claims. This point should also put the lie to McBride’s claim that only a duty-based account of 
tort law can explain punitive damages. If American law is cynical and yet awards punitive damages 
much more frequently than English law, then the claim that only idealism can explain punitive 
damages looks suspect. If anything, it suggests that the correlation goes in the opposite direction: the 
more cynical is the approach to tort law, the more sympathetic it is likely to be to punitive damages, 
exactly because it takes a broader, social, view of (the goals of) tort law. 
This point can be substantiated beyond mere speculation. Academic commentary on punitive 
damages is something of an American obsession, and yet McBride does not mention, let alone 
examine, any of the arguments that have been put forward in support of them. Had he done that, he 
would have seen that there are numerous defences of punitive damages that give little place to duty. 
There are, for example, various arguments explaining punitive law from an economic perspective, 
which (consistent with the general approach of legal economists) largely dispense with the question 
of duty. Probably the best known and simplest of them is the idea that punitive damages are 
economically justified as a means for dealing with the less-than-perfect enforcement of tortious 
behaviour, which can lead to under-deterrence.43 One finds in the American literature also non-
economic arguments for punitive damages, but they too are unlikely to appeal to McBride as they 
emphasise the role of punitive damages in serving societal goals that criminal law cannot adequately 
fulfil,44 and as such are likely to appear, from McBride’s perspective, as ‘attempts to twist and 
distort tort law’s basic rules and doctrines…to achieve collective goals’.45 
                                                                   
40 S. Perry, ‘Torts, Rights, and Risk’ in J. Oberdiek (ed), The Philosophy of Tort Law (forthcoming 2014), 
manuscript at 7; see also S. Perry, ‘The Role of Duty of Care in a Rights-Based Theory’ in The Goals of Private Law, in 
A. Robertson & T.H. Wu (eds), The Goals of Private Law (Oxford: Hart, 2009) 79, 80–91.  
41 See Dillon v Legg (1968) 441 P2d 912, 916–917; Rowland v Christian (1968) 443 P2d 561, 568. 
42 A. Liptak, ‘Foreign Courts Wary of U.S. Punitive Damages’ NY Times, 26 March 2008, A1.  
43 A.M. Polinski  & S. Shavell, ‘Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis’ (1998) 111 Harv L Rev 869. There are 
other economic arguments, e.g. in R.D. Cooter, ‘Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages’ (1982) 56 S Cal L Rev 79. 
Goldberg & Zipursky, ‘Torts and Wrongs’ n 3 above, 961, dismiss this explanation as inconsistent with the law. 
Contrary to what they say, however, there are cases that explicitly embraced this rationale, e.g. Mathias v Accor 
Economy Lodging Inc (2003) 347 F3d 672, 677. In any case, the criticism is irrelevant to the point I make in the text, which 
is that cynical views have no difficulty account for punitive damages.  
44 See M. Galanter & D. Luban, ‘Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism’ (1993) 42 Am U L Rev 
1393, 1440: ‘punitive damages are the only practical method of exercising social control over economically formidable 
offenders, especially organizational offenders, because criminal penalties are no substitute’. 
45 N.J. McBride, ‘Rights and the Basis of Tort Law’ in D. Nolan & A. Robertson (eds), Rights and Private Law 
(Oxford: Hart, 2011) 331, 361. 
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McBride ignores not just relevant academic discussion on punitive damages, but also 
important aspects of the law itself, which in many American states requires a substantial part of 
those damages (in some cases, seventy five per cent) to go to the state.46 Such a rule can be 
accommodated within the economic approach (it can prevent the distorting effects on optimal 
behaviour that massive damage awards can have on potential victims) or on the view that sees 
punitive damages are awarded in response to a communal harm. If there is one view that has 
difficulty with such rules, it is the idealist one. On the idealist account the award of punitive 
damages is explained exclusively in terms of the bilateral relations that exist between tortfeasor and 
victim. As such, punitive damages are, quite simply, none of the state’s business. 
So it turns out that the way American law actually deals with punitive damages lends little 
support for the idealist view. Given that I do not think one can learn about English tort law by 
examining doctrines that are not part of it, this finding provides little support for the question 
regarding English tort law. But we reach similar conclusions by looking at English law itself. We 
must first distinguish between aggravated and punitive damages. To the extent that the former are 
concerned with humiliation or other dignitary harms, they are compensatory in nature, and as such 
do not pose any special trouble for the cynical view. It is only damages that are not meant to 
compensate for any harm to the claimant with which we are concerned.47 McBride suggests that 
punitive damages may be used on the idealist view to punish a defendant who egregiously violated 
another person’s right. The problem is that if English tort law had been indeed concerned with 
something like this idea, one would have expected to see the development of an elaborate doctrinal 
framework concerned with the question of the severity of infringement of right instead of the law’s 
current concern with the size of the loss the defendant inflicted on the claimant. In such a regime, 
punitive damages would not have been an anomaly for which one has to turn to foreign jurisdictions 
for examples, but a routine occurrence. Furthermore, though logically it is possible to limit 
considerations of fault only to cases of egregious violations, there seems to be no good reason (and 
definitely no reason is provided) for limiting the evaluation of the severity of the breach only to 
increase damages. On McBride’s rationale, it would make sense to say that punitive damages are 
one end of a spectrum of damages awards; at the other end of the spectrum, corresponding to 
punitive damages, we would have seen lower damages awarded just as regularly in cases of only 
slight infringements of the claimant’s duty, even if the resulting loss had been significant. None of 
this reflects present doctrine on damages, although, interestingly, it reflects what the law used to be 
in the past.48 To try to fit current law within this view, one has to argue that the size of the claimant’s 
loss is a proxy for the severity of the defendant’s infringement. But we know that this is often not the 
case, and there is no indication that the courts have taken such a view. 
                                                                   
46 See A. Sebok, ‘Punitive Damages in the United States’ in H. Koziol & V. Wilcox (eds), Punitive Damages: 
Common Law and Civil Law Perspectives (Vienna: Springer, 2009) 155, 176–178. 
47 Incidentally, exactly for this reason an opponent of tort cynicism has argued that unlike aggravated damages, 
punitive damages ‘are necessarily out of place in private law’. See A. Beever, ‘The Structure of Aggravated and 
Exemplary Damages’ (2003) 23 OJLS 87, 105–110.  
48 See J.C.P. Goldberg, ‘Two Conceptions of Tort Damages: Fair v. Full Compensation’ (2006) 55 DePaul L Rev 
435, 447–462. Goldberg argues that this was Blackstone’s view as well. See ibid 442. As Zipursky explicitly grounds his 
views on punitive damages on the ‘original role of punitive damages in English law’ (B.C. Zipursky, ‘Palsgraf, Punitive 
Damages, and Preemption’ (2012) 125 Harv L Rev 1757, 1779) it is surprising he does not address the fact that this view 
also required reducing damages in the case of minor infringements. 
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Injunctions.49 Injunctions are another example of a doctrine McBride claims can only be 
explained by idealism. Lacking in English cases to support his case, he once again turns to American 
law as evidence about the nature of English tort law, using the same refrain: ‘it would be strange if 
the law of England and the law of the United States differed on whether duties of care really 
existed’.50  
I will not repeat what I said earlier on this form of argument; I will, however, add some points 
relating specifically to injunctions. Whatever one thinks of injunctions in English law, McBride’s 
importation from American law is, once again, very selective and fails to mention the cases that do 
not support his view. I will only mention one, the famous case of Boomer v Atlantic Cement,51 where 
the New York Court of Appeals allowed for a nuisance to continue so long as the defendant paid 
compensation. This case reflects the broader doctrine of ‘undue hardship’ according to which even 
when it is found that a defendant violated the claimant’s legal rights, the court may still take into 
account the hardship that the imposition of an injunction may have on the defendant and choose to 
award only damages instead.52 Though this is a nuisance case, it is relevant in this context. Idealists 
usually think that the idealist view is true of all of tort law, and if even in nuisance, the decision to 
award an injunction involves broad societal considerations, it is hard to see how the very rare 
instance of injunction in the context of negligence could support idealism. 
Matters are not better when we turn to English law. There are no cases of injunction for 
negligence and there are some judicial statements suggesting that injunctions are never an 
appropriate remedy for negligence.53 The plausible conclusion to draw from all this is that 
contemporary tort law does not follow idealist strictures. The most one could say is that a broadly 
cynical framework contains a few minor tokens of idealism.  
Is the cynical view paradoxical? McBride contends that cynicism is paradoxical, because it 
asserts that ‘the common law does not actually impose a duty on A to take care not to run B over: it 
merely imposes a duty on A to pay B damages if he carelessly runs her over’. That, says McBride, is 
odd: ‘why would the common law seek to protect B after she has been run over but not before?’54 The 
idealist view, says McBride, has no difficulty with this situation: it consistently demands that A not 
wrong B in advance, and that A pay damages after the fact if A actually wronged B.  
There is inconsistency here only if one already presupposes idealism. If it is legal wrongs we 
are talking about, we should not assume that there has to be something wrong (in the everyday 
sense of the word) with an activity to require payment for certain costs associated with it.55 Taxes 
are levied after the fact for certain activities (say, purchasing property) without any suggestion that 
act in question is wrong. The idealist will, of course, reply that the difference between torts and taxes 
                                                                   
49 Here, I only discuss the paucity of injunctions as a challenge to McBride’s argument. In section III.B I make the 
opposite point, namely that tort cynicism has no difficulty in accounting for injunctions. 
50 McBride, n 4 above, 429; McBride & Bagshaw (4th ed), n 3 above, 14. 
51 (1970) 287 NY2d 219.  
52 See D. Laycock, ‘The Neglected Defense of Undue Hardship (and the Doctrinal Train Wreck in Boomer v. 
Atlantic Cement’ (2011) 4(3) J Tort L, article 2. As the title of his essay indicates, Laycock criticises Boomer, but he does 
so for its inconsistency with the doctrine of undue hardship, not for its inconsistency with the nature of tort law. 
53 Miller v Jackson [1977] 1 QB 966, 980 (‘If the plaintiff seeks a remedy in damages for injury done to him or his 
property, he can lay his claim either in negligence or nuisance. But if he seeks an injunction to stop the playing of cricket 
altogether, I think he must make his claim in nuisance’). 
54 McBride, n 4 above, 425. Here I only deal with the question of inconsistency. In section III.A I challenge the 
assumption that tort law tries to prevent wrongs from happening in advance. 
55 It may be that in morality too we distinguish between activities that should be engaged in because they are 
wrong, and those that are wrong when not accompanied by payment. There is nothing wrong with employing someone 
else so long as one pays for the work; it becomes wrong when one withholds pay for the work done. 
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is that the former are concerned with wrongs while the latter are not; that, however, is exactly the 
contested question. The cynic can consistently reply that it is possible, and sometimes desirable, to 
think of tort liability as something like a tax. This is no mere academic talk. There are judicial 
statements, and correspondingly legal doctrines, that support the view that some tort damages 
should be considered as ‘a hidden cost of running a given system’,56 a fee that needs to be paid for 
engaging in an otherwise useful activity. 
Even without invoking taxes McBride’s conclusion is not warranted, because it is the result of 
his serious misunderstanding of the nature of the cynic’s interpretation of tort law. He presents the 
cynical view as ‘an option to be careless so far as [the claimant] is concerned’, and then wonders on 
behalf of the cynic: ‘why would the courts go out of their way to deprive him of that option?’57 This, 
of course, is not what the cynical view, on any description of it, is. The option the cynic alleges is 
between complying with a certain standard of care and then being free from liability if harm occurs, 
or not doing so and then paying compensation if someone is injured as a result. It is therefore clear 
there is no inconsistency in saying to someone in advance: ‘you may choose between complying with 
a standard set by the law or not; if you do, you will be free from liability; if you do not and harm 
occurs as a result, you will have to pay damages’. This may be a bad message for a legal system to 
send, but it is not paradoxical.  
Causation. McBride argues that ‘courts will sometimes distort the law on causation in order to 
ensure that people who are subject to a particular duty of care are not allowed to breach that duty of 
care without incurring some kind of sanction’.58 He goes on to describe three cases in which he 
thinks the courts did just that. One reason to doubt McBride’s claims that cynicism cannot explain 
the relaxation of causation rules and that it is idealism that motivated them to do that, is that the 
judges who led the House of Lords in two of the three cases he mentioned, Lords Reid and Bingham, 
were supporters of a more minimal role for the duty question in negligence.59 Of course, it is possible 
that they were inconsistent, but McBride has not shown that.  
More to the point, McBride’s argument again ignores the fact that the cynical view puts 
considerable weight on the question whether the defendant’s behaviour was careless. In all the cases 
McBride mentions in this context, the defendant fell below a certain required standard of behaviour. 
The source of the difficulty was in deciding whether this failure to comply with a standard of care 
caused the claimant’s injury, or whether it was some other cause (someone else’s carelessness, the 
claimant’s own carelessness, or an ‘innocent’ natural cause) that brought about the injury. This 
question, which has nothing to do with the debate between the cynic and the idealist (which concerns 
the question of duty of care), is one that the idealist has to answer no less than the cynic. In other 
words, to the extent that indeterminate causation raises difficulties for the cynical view, it raises the 
                                                                   
56 Tock v St John’s Metropolitan Area Board [1989] 2 SCR 1181, 1201 (La Forest J, concurring); Escola v Coca-
Cola Bottling Co (1944) 24 Cal 2d 453, 462 (Traynor J, concurring) (‘the risk of injury can be insured by the manufacturer 
and distributed among the public as a cost of doing business’); cf Brand v Hammersmith and City Railway (1867) LR 2 
QB 223, 231 (Bramwell, B). For an experimental study showing the blurry boundaries between fines paid for the 
commission of a wrong and price paid for a service see U. Gneezy & A. Rustichini, ‘A Fine Is a Price’ (2000) 29 J Legal 
Stud 1. 
57 McBride, n 4 above, 431. 
58 Ibid at 430; McBride & Bagshaw (4th ed), n 3 above, 121. 
59 For Reid’s view see note 18; for Bingham’s see D v East Berkshire Community Health NHS Trust [2005] UKHL 
23, [2005] 2 AC 373 at [49]. The third case McBride mentions, Reeves v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [2000] 1 
AC 360, is irrelevant. The case rests on the idea that when one’s duty is to prevent someone from behaving in a certain 
way, the latter’s acting in exactly that way cannot be the basis for exoneration from liability. Reeves thus did not require 
‘distorting’ of the rules on either causation or remoteness any more than Dorset Yacht did. 
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same difficulties for the idealist view. In fact, quite possibly the idealist faces greater difficulty. The 
idealist either has to say that duty and breach alone constitute a legal right violation (in which case, 
the causation requirement in most cases is inexplicable), or else she has to explain how imposing 
liability when it is not clear whether there was a violation of a legal right promotes the view that 
insists that a rights-violation is the heart of negligence liability.60 The cynic, on the other hand, can 
rely on societal considerations like preferring an innocent party to a careless one, or on the policy of 
inducing more careful conduct from a party that was unquestionably careless, to explain the 
imposition of liability.  
III. Why Cynicism 
I have focused so far on the weakness of the case for idealism. This does not yet amount to an 
argument in favour of the cynical view. But the question ‘why cynicism?’ is ambiguous. In one sense 
it seeks to explain why cynicism provides a superior explanation of current tort law; in another it is 
concerned with the question of justification. Though the questions are related, the first subsection 
focuses on the explanatory question while the second on the normative one.  
A. The Reality of Tort Law Supports Cynicism 
My assumption is that determining whether tort law is closer to the idealist or the cynical model 
depends on what tort law is in practice. In doing that we should look at what tort law is like today. 
Idealists sometimes talk as though tort law has some unchanging nature such that its ‘nature’ in the 
late nineteenth century (let alone before) must be the same as it is today. But as a human practice it is 
perfectly possible that though idealism once adequately explained tort law, the law changed to such 
a degree that it no longer does.61 Undaunted, idealists sometimes treat cynicism as the view of ivory 
tower academics, out of touch with actual legal practice. We are thus told that ‘[t]he loss 
compensation model of tort law simply does not fit the way we think and speak about tort law’, and 
even more strongly that ‘at the very deepest level, we must subscribe to the idea that committing a 
tort involves doing something wrong to someone else’.62 Along similar lines, we are told that ‘the law 
presents itself as a normative institution—as an institution that tells people how they ought to 
behave….There are rules specifying that contracts should be performed, that no one should enter 
another’s property without permission, that money paid by mistake should be returned and so on’.63 
Such statements are taken to be so self-evident that no evidence for them is ever given. But, so I 
will argue, these statements are in fact not true. Starting with how the law ‘presents itself’, there are 
no doubt some judicial statements that support this view, but there are others that do not. At most 
we can say that at the level of judicial rhetoric some judges on some occasions adopt idealist 
language. Idealists conveniently ignore the fact that Bramwell, Holmes, Denning, Posner, Traynor, 
Bingham, La Forest, and many others from all over the common law world have not only been 
observers offering their interpretations of what the law is, but that as judges (and in some cases 
influential commentators as well), they have helped shape it. There is something odd about the claim 
that idealism reflects actual practice when this requires us to ignore some of the best known, most 
                                                                   
60 It is thus unsurprising that some idealists disapproved of decisions that favoured claimants in cases of 
indeterminate causation. See Stevens, n 3 above, 149–151; E.J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, rev ed, 2012) 155–158. 
61 See notes 29, 48, 88, all hinting at such changes. But see text accompanying notes 96–97. 
62 McBride & Bagshaw (4th ed), n 3 above, 14 (emphasis added). 
63 S.A. Smith, ‘The Normativity of Private Law’ (2011) 31 OJLS 215, 221, also ibid 238. 
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cited judges of the last two centuries. (These names also show that the origins of cynicism are much 
older than is sometimes suggested.) Furthermore, even if idealism reflected accurately tort law at the 
appellate level, it ignores the reality of the more run-of-the-mill tort case, the one that typically does 
not even reach trial, where the cynical view is even more clearly dominant.64  
If we wish to look beyond judicial rhetoric to see what tort law does, we must first separate the 
normative requirements imposed by tort law from those created by other branches of the law. 
McBride’s discussion at times sounds as though tort law is the only area of law that exists;65 but if 
there is an area of law that typically deals with prohibitions of the kind he talks about it is criminal 
law, where public authorities typically do make an active effort to prevent wrongs from happening. 
Idealists pass over this striking difference between criminal law and tort law. Therefore, to distil the 
message sent by tort law alone, we need to find instances of civil wrongs that do not give rise to any 
other kind of legal response. It is in these cases that we can identify the message sent by tort law 
unadulterated by the potential message coming from other areas of law. It is here that we can test the 
hypothesis McBride poses, namely that ‘the courts will go out of their way to ensure that [a 
defendant] is not given an option to be careless so far as [the plaintiff] is concerned’.66  
The reality is that in such cases of ‘pure’ civil wrong this is exactly what the courts do not do. 
The clearest example comes not from tort law itself, but from breach of contract, which idealists treat 
as a legal wrong similar on a par to the commission of a tort.67 I have quoted the idealist claim that 
‘[t]here are rules specifying that contracts should be performed’. But where are these rules? 
Unsurprisingly, no such rule is cited, because, definitely in the canonical form he presents it, no such 
rule exists. There are rules that specify what happens if contracts are not performed; to say that 
these rules mean that contracts should be performed is an idealist interpretation of these rules. How 
convincing is this interpretation? To examine this question assume for a moment that the law takes 
the idealist view about the matter, and now imagine that it changes from idealism to cynicism. What 
would change? The answer is, very little, except perhaps some judicial rhetoric. People would still 
mostly perform, because they prefer the performance of a contract to its non-performance, or 
because they fear the reputational effects of non-performance. But if they breach, the legal effects of 
non-performance would be the same. For all of the scorn for Holmes’s view on breach of contract 
‘enjoys little popularity nowadays’,68 Holmes’s simple point was that when one examines what 
                                                                   
64 Some pertinent information on this is found in R. Lewis & A. Morris, ‘Tort Law Culture: Image and Reality’ 
(2012) 39 JL & Soc 562, 564–578; cf S. Halliday et al, ‘Street-Level Tort Law: The Bureaucratic Justice of Liability 
Decision-Making’ (2012) 75 MLR 347. 
65 Consider this: ‘It is as well that tort textbooks and articles [espousing the cynical view] do not enjoy a wide 
circulation outside legal circles. For example, would we really want doctors and nurses to think that the law does not 
actually require them to treat their patients with a reasonable degree of care and skill; that the only thing the law requires 
them to do is to pay their patient damages if they fail to treat them properly?’ McBride & Bagshaw (3rd ed), n 3 above, 
16–17 n 13. See also the words quoted from them in text to note 87 below. The answer is that there may be other relevant 
laws outside tort law that explain why it is false to think that tort cynicism implies that the ‘only’ thing required of 
doctors is to pay damages if they fail to treat properly.  
66 McBride, n 4 above, 431. 
67 Ibid 417; P. Birks, ‘Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies’ (2000) 20 OJLS 1, 5. 
68 McBride, n 4 above, 417. This is, of course, not true. Holmes’s view is supported by virtually all of the (very 
many) proponents of economic analysis of contract law. See e.g. L. Kaplow & S. Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002) 166–169; R.A. Posner, ‘Let Us Never Blame a Contract Breaker’ (2009) 
107 Mich L Rev 1349. It also has non-economic supporters. See D.J. Markovits, ‘Making and Keeping Promises’ (2006) 
92 Va L Rev 1325, 1345–1346. It even has some judicial support in England. See R v East Berkshire Health Authority, ex 
p Walsh [1985] QB 152, 165: ‘The ordinary employer is free to act in breach of his contracts of employment and if he does 
so his employee will acquire certain private law rights and remedies…’. 
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actually happens, one finds that in effect one has a choice between performing and breaching (and 
paying damages). Moreover, even if one were to find legal texts that specified in no uncertain terms 
that the law considers it wrong (even morally wrong) to breach a contract, that would not yet 
establish the existence of a legal rule,69 because for the most part these texts would have no practical 
effect, just as the cynic says. This may be due to the fact that legal proceedings are so slow that by 
the time contractual disputes are resolved specific performance is no longer possible or practical, but 
this does not undermine the cynic’s point, it confirms it. (Note that I can say all this without saying 
anything on the question of whether breach of contract is morally wrong. One can easily find 
statements, including judicial statements, proclaiming that breach of contract is sometimes 
desirable.) 
When we turn back to issues more commonly discussed under the heading of ‘tort law’, we can 
identify a similar pattern. For all the trumpeting of the odd injunction for negligence or the rare case 
of punitive damages, by far the most typical tort remedy is compensatory damages awarded after a 
tort has been committed. On the idealist view this means that the legal system allows wrongdoing on 
a massive scale to happen on a daily basis so long as the wrongdoer is willing to pay for her actions 
after the fact. McBride may reply that there are practical difficulties with preventing most wrongs in 
advance; but while at some level this is true, criminal law shows that there is more the law could do. 
And in any case, as already mentioned, whatever practical difficulties exist with maintaining the 
idealist view, they are part of any realistic account of what tort law does. Even if judges say they 
adopt the idealist stance, and even if they genuinely support it, practical constraints may make 
idealism an unattainable ideal.  
To see this consider McBride’s hypothetical case of a car manufacturer who discovers that due 
to a fault in their brakes one car in 50,000 will ‘fail catastrophically’, and consequently endanger the 
lives of people in the car.70 He argues that what the law requires in such a situation will be different 
whether tort law is understood in idealistic or cynical way. If it is the former, the law imposes a duty 
on the manufacturer to ‘do [its] best to warn [users of the car] of the danger they are in so that they 
can avoid it by ceasing to drive [its] cars or by having the brakes looked at’,71 but on the cynical 
interpretation such a situation only means that if the car manufacturer does not warn drivers of the 
car of these dangers, and harm results from not warning people, the car manufacturer will be liable 
to pay compensation.  
This case is ambiguous between two scenarios, one in which the risk in question could have 
been eliminated cheaply, the other in which the costs of elimination exceed the expected loss from the 
risk. On the first reading, liability would be imposed on the cynical, but perhaps not on the idealist 
view. If we follow Lord Reid’s opinion in Bolton v Stone,72 a view often preferred by idealists,73 it is 
not clear whether liability would be imposed in this case. Since on this view we should not consider 
the costs of eliminating a risk, the only relevant factor is the expected harm, and as the probability of 
harm is small, it may not warrant liability.  
                                                                   
69 For more on this, especially on the different between texts and rules see D. Priel, ‘Trouble for Legal Positivism?’ 
(2006) 12 Legal Theory 225, 231–34. 
70 McBride, n 4 above, 420. The example is based on Grimshaw v Ford Motor Co (1981) 174 Cal Rptr 348, better 
known as the ‘Ford Pinto case’. McBride acknowledges that his hypothetical is not a good description of that case. See 
McBride, n 4 above, 427 n 31. Of course, McBride may set his hypothetical case any way he wishes, but the reality of the 
case weakens the force of the conclusion McBride drew from it on punitive damages. 
71 Ibid 420. 
72 Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850, 867.  
73 Weinrib, n 60 above, 149–152. 
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To translate a risk of failure in 1 in 50,000 manufactured cars to a risk to individuals I will 
assume that all faulty cars will fail within four years of purchase. That means that on my 
assumptions any buyer of this model has a 1 in 200,000 chance of being in a malfunctioning car in 
any of the four subsequent years. This is a small risk compared to other road risks. In any given year 
an average Briton is exposed to the risk of about 1 in 20,000 of dying in a traffic accident; this 
translates to a lifetime risk of about 1 in 240.74 (This example shows that Reid’s approach, usually 
considered a rejection of cost-benefit analysis in favour of a more duty-protecting approach, may 
exonerate some defendants that cost-benefit analysis would find liable.) If this is the case, the 
defendant in McBride’s example will not have to do anything. 
It is unclear, however, whether Lord Reid’s position in Bolton reflects English law. The 
significance of this comes out in the more realistic alternative, in which the carmaker decided not to 
eliminate the risk because it was costly to do so. On this reading of the scenario, it is possible that 
English tort law would not find a carmaker negligent in the case McBride envisages, because English 
courts have often embraced a test of carelessness not very different from Judge Learned Hand’s 
famous formula. Only a few years after Bolton Lord Reid himself stated that  
it is the duty of an employer, in considering whether some precaution should be taken against a foreseeable 
risk, to weigh, on the one hand, the magnitude of the risk, the likelihood of an accident happening and the 
possible seriousness of the consequences if an accident does happen, and, on the other hand, the difficulty and 
expense and any other disadvantage of taking the precaution.75  
While courts cannot usually make precise assessments of costs and benefits of eliminating risks, the 
prevailing view seems to be that both factors are relevant. If it were shown that the risk McBride 
envisaged was expensive to eliminate, the law would seem to favour the cynical view. 
This shows that whatever intuitive appeal McBride’s example may have does not come from 
anything derived from tort idealism, but from the highly visible image that the catastrophic failure 
of the brakes creates in our minds, a scenario we can easily imagine and we expect never to happen. 
Such reactions, however, stand in the way of rational discussion.76 Rational discussion in this 
context will avoid anecdotes and focus instead on traffic accidents statistics and try to learn from 
them whether ‘the courts will go out of their way’ to prevent torts from happening.  
One of the most robust empirical findings about risk analysts is that the marginal costs of 
reducing risks rise extremely steeply,77 and in line with that, if we know anything about cars, it is 
that they are not perfectly safe: thousands of people die as a result of car accidents every year as a 
result of others’ negligence. We also know, although we prefer not to admit it, that virtually all these 
deaths are preventable. Whether the source of the accident is negligent mechanical malfunction or 
negligent human error, we could avoid car accidents by banning cars (and expanding public 
                                                                   
74 These statistics (for the years 2004–05) are taken from 
http://www.medicine.ox.ac.uk/bandolier/booth/Risk/trasnsportpop.html. The UK is safe in comparison with countries 
such as France (lifetime risk of 1 in 158) or the US (1 in 82).  
75 Morris v West Hartlepool Steam Navigation Co Ltd [1956] AC 552, 574 (emphasis added); see also his view in 
Overseas Tankship (UK) Ltd v Mill Steamship Co Pty [1967] 1 AC 617, 642. For a detailed discussion see S.G. Gilles, 
‘The Emergence of Cost–Benefit Balancing in English Negligence Law’ (2002) 77 Chi-Kent L Rev 489. 
76 Cf G.F. Loewenstein et al, ‘Risk as Feelings’ (2001) 127 Psychological Bulletin 267, who argue that people’s 
reaction to risk is often affected by their emotional reaction to it. They further contend that the ‘vividness’ with which 
certain outcomes ‘are described or represented mentally’ is of great significance in affecting reaction to risk. Ibid 275. 
More generally on the tendency to ignore probabilities in the assessment of risks that evoke ‘emotional’ reactions and 
focus in these cases only on the harms see Y. Rottenstreich & C.K. Hsee, ‘Money, Kisses, and Electric Shocks: On the 
Affective Psychology of Risk’ (2001) 12 Psychological Science 185, 188–90. 
77 See S.R. Breyer, Breaking the Vicious Circle: Toward Effective Risk Regulation (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1993) 11–14. 
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transportation), or alternatively by limiting their speed to five miles per hour.78 That we do not, 
suggests that as a society we deem the costs associated with such alternatives as too high.79 It may 
sound extremely cynical to say that (and not just in the sense McBride used the term), but the reality 
is that human society has chosen the convenience and benefits that come from owning private cars 
over the protection of thousands of lives. It is McBride’s own example that forces the idealist to 
explain how to reconcile tort idealism with the apparent cynical way the law treats the legal rights to 
life and bodily integrity of virtually everyone.  
That does not mean that for whatever reason society may not choose to set a minimum safety 
level for cars, thereby making them safer but more expensive. Government regulation has done just 
that and this has resulted in considerable improvement in car safety. It is notable, though, that tort 
law has contributed very little for the establishment of such standards.80 Virtually all efforts on the 
part of the state to prevent accidents from happening—by means of education, car safety regulation, 
driving licensing, mandatory car inspections, road traffic rules, criminal law, and mandatory 
insurance—have not been the work of common law courts in tort cases.81 Tort law may have 
contributed to these efforts through its deterrent effect,82 or even more indirectly by inculcating 
certain social norms. Furthermore, to the extent that there are differences in the level of safety 
provided by different cars, tort law is unconcerned about them. Tort law does not consider it 
negligent for individuals to make precisely the sort of choice McBride claims it forbids: within the 
limits set by regulation it allows carmakers to manufacture cheaper but less safe cars, allowing 
buyers to trade cost for safety. The less safe cars expose their users to risks of death that may be less 
dramatic but no less real (and possibly more probable) than McBride’s hypothetical example. In 
fact, the law permits carmakers to manufacture cars that impose greater risks on others,83 and it does 
not stop people from driving them.  
Based on his hypothetical, McBride should be very troubled by these facts, for what they show 
is that tort law, which purportedly takes the idealist view, does not concern itself with the 
negligently-caused deaths and injuries of thousands every year, all for the sake of convenience. 
What he focuses on—a requirement to inform buyers of a small manufacturing risk—seems in 
comparison almost trifling in significance. Even here, however, it is not clear that the law takes 
McBride’s view. If the issue in question is disclosure of potential risks, it resembles the question of 
                                                                   
78 Cf Daborn v Bath Tramways Motor Co Ltd [1946] 2 All ER 333, 336: ‘if all the trains in this country were 
restricted to a speed of five miles an hour, there would be fewer accidents, but our national life would be intolerably 
slowed down’. 
79 R. Stevens, ‘The Conflict of Rights’ in The Goals of Private Law, n 40 above, 139, 152, considers the idea of 
excessive precautions ‘barmy’. But there is nothing barmy about that: constant washing of hands or not leaving the house 
fear of accidents are everyday examples of excessive precautions with highly deleterious consequences. More to the point, 
it is exactly the idea that excessive precautions have high costs (such as those involved with banning cars) that explains 
aspects of our everyday life and uncontroversial aspects of tort liability (e.g. complaints about defensive medicine).  
80 See J.L. Mashaw & D.L. Harfst, The Struggle for Auto Safety (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1990) 39–
46. 
81 This is particularly ironic in the case of McBride, someone whose writings expresses unhidden dislike for state 
institutions. For a discussion see Priel, n 21 above, 18–22. 
82 The law’s impact here is unclear, especially when individuals are concerned. See W.J. Cardi et al, ‘Does Tort Law 
Deter Individuals? A Behavioral Science Study’ (2012) 9 J Empirical Legal Stud 567. 
83 Many studies show that sport-utility vehicles impose significantly greater risks to pedestrians than other cars. 
See e.g. D.E. Lefler & H.C. Gabler, ‘The Fatality and Injury Risk of Light Truck Impacts with Pedestrians in the United 
States’ (2003) 36 Accident Analysis and Prevention 295; L.J. Paulozzi, ‘United States Pedestrian Fatality Rates by Vehicle 
Type’ (2005) 11 Injury Prevention 232; C.K. Simms & D.P. Wood, ‘Pedestrian Risk from Cars and Sport Utility 
Vehicles—A Comparative Analytical Study’ (2006) 220 Journal of Automobile Engineering 1085. 
18 
 
informed consent to medical treatment. The attitude taken by English law is that potential victims 
need not be informed about such tiny risks as the one in his example. For comparison, a risk of 
slightly less than one per cent was deemed too small to require disclosing.84 And indeed, I do not 
know of a case that imposed tort liability on carmakers for not providing comparative statistics on 
car safety to prospective buyers.   
If motor vehicles are a known means for repeated and severe wrongs on a huge scale, why have 
courts done so little about that? McBride’s idealism has led him to the view that negligence is 
committed whenever one creates an excessive risk of physical harm even if no harm actually 
occurred.85 Leaving aside the fact that this is not the prevailing view in the courts, what follows from 
it, as anyone who has been in a car will acknowledge, is that there are in fact many more instances of 
negligence committed on the road every day than there are road accidents.86 This fact is very difficult 
to reconcile with the claim that tort law courts will go out of their way to make sure legal rights are 
not violated.  
There are two idealist answers I can envisage. One of them—that individuals’ freedom to own 
and drive a car should not be curtailed for those who do not commit torts while driving—I will 
address in the next section. The other is that unlike the enforcement and prevention mechanisms 
provided for the criminal law, common law courts have no resources to prevent torts from 
happening beyond the creation of duties of care. And if they did, the idealist would add, tort law 
would become part of public law. This response does not vindicate the idealist view, it shows that 
within the institutional constraints in which tort law operates, it cannot be anything but cynical. 
This suggests that even when ‘going out of their way’ common law courts cannot do anything but 
say that duties should not be breached. Consequently, even if the law purports to be idealistic a 
carmaker with a duty to disclose risks in its products can either disclose the risk and thus ‘insure’ 
itself against liability, or not do so and risk liability if harm occurs. If the law is candid about this 
fact, it is cynical; if it is not, it may be idealistic in what it says, but cynical (as well as hypocritical) 
in what it does. 
A different kind of difficulty for idealism is the fact that tort law permits tortfeasors not to pay 
themselves for their breaches. We are told by idealists that if tort law were abolished, the legal 
system would lose a means of ‘satisfying the victim of a tort’s perception that the person who 
committed that tort must be made to pay for the fact that he has ridden roughshod over the victim’s 
rights’.87 This quasi-retributivist conception of tort law is part and parcel of the idealist conception of 
tort duties as wrongs, but, once again, reality is quite different. Tort law is concerned that those who 
suffered certain losses get compensated, not with who pays for them. If I get my rich uncle to pay the 
damages for a tort I committed (either before or after a tort claim in court) this is not something that 
tort law has any concern about. (Contrast this with the criminal law’s reaction to my uncle’s offer to 
serve time in prison instead of me after my conviction of a crime.) In fact, the law sometimes even 
demands that individuals not personally pay for the torts they committed by requiring them to 
acquire liability insurance for certain activities.88 
                                                                   
84 Sidaway v Board of Governors of Bethlem Royal Hospital [1985] AC 871. 
85 McBride & Bagshaw (4th ed), n 3 above, 121, explicitly say so.  
86 For some sobering statistics see P. Cane, Atiyah’s Accidents, Compensation, and the Law (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 8th ed, 2013) 174–175. 
87 McBride & Bagshaw (4th ed), n 3 above, 902 (emphasis added). 
88 In earlier times, when ideas of moral fault played a more prominent role in tort liability, liability insurance was 
considered illegal. See Delanoy v Robson (1814) 128 ER 827, 827 (‘It would be illegal insurance to insure against what 
might be the consequences of the wrongful acts of the assured’); W.R. Cornish & G. De N. Clark, Law and Society in 
England 1750–1950 (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1989) 513–514. 
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Though much of what I have said has focused on negligence, let me add one more example 
from a different part of tort law. It is worth mentioning because idealists typically claim the idealist 
view is true not just of negligence, but of all torts. Defamation law for the most part allows 
individuals to publish whatever they want and then pay damages if the publication is found 
defamatory. Here, once again, American law is particularly inhospitable to idealism. Because of 
worries about the chilling effect that prior restraint may have on freedom of speech, it is rare to have 
an allegedly defamatory publication enjoined before trial.89 Though freedom of speech is not as 
stringently protected in English law, English courts have adopted a fairly similar stance.90 If such a 
cynical view is conceptually tenable in defamation, it is hard to see why it is not in negligence. 
Defamation, however, is a particularly useful example, because it helps to introduce the point to 
which I turn now, namely that tort cynicism may not just be a second-best compromise, but rather a 
desirable feature of the law.  
B. The Case for Cynicism 
The idealist’s last stand may be that reality indeed fits the cynical view, but this is to be regretted. As 
there are two idealist views, there are two corresponding arguments for two aspects of tort cynicism, 
one that focuses on the question of the determination of duty of care, the other that focuses on the 
implications of a finding of a duty of care. Again, I will largely limit myself here to the second 
question. What I hope to show is that there is little to dislike and much to like in the view that it does 
not automatically follow from the fact that there are tort duties of care that one should never breach 
them. But before presenting my argument, it is important to correct one fundamental error about tort 
cynicism that is relevant also for understanding the cynic’s view of the first question, namely how 
the law comes to classify those harms not compensable through tort law for lack of ‘duty of care’. On 
any plausible account, the cynical view of tort law is not only concerned with compensation for 
losses. Economic theories of tort law that typically offer the most thoroughgoing cynical perspective 
on the law are concerned with loss compensation only indirectly, as a means for setting the optimal 
level of risk (and loss) people may cause each other. Nor is it concerned with compensation for all 
losses.91 To take the most familiar example, cynics may readily agree that economic competition is 
permissible, perhaps desirable, even though it causes losses to some. Importantly, cynics may even 
be willing to identify in advance general categories of no liability, and those may be called ‘no duty’ 
areas. Where cynics differ from idealists is on how to distinguish between those activities 
condemned by tort law and those that are not. Generation-idealists think that the analysis of rights 
and duties people owe to each other is up for the task; cynics find this language too vague and 
                                                                   
89 See e.g. Sid Dillon Chevrolet-Oldsmobile-Pontiac, Inc v Sullivan, (1997) 559 NW2d 740, 745–746. For the 
generally restrictive attitude towards injunctions (interim or permanent) limiting speech see Alexander v US (1993) 509 
US 544, 550. 
90 See e.g. Bonnard v Perryman [1891] 2 Ch 269; Greene v Associated Newspapers Ltd [2004] EWCA Civ 1462, 
[2005] 1 QB 972. Incidentally, there was a time when injunction against a defamatory publication was not available even 
after a successful suit. See P. Mitchell, The Making of the Modern Law of Defamation (Oxford: Hart, 2005) 79–80. This 
view still has its defenders in the US and it has found favour with some courts there. See E. Chemerinksy, ‘Injunctions in 
Defamation Cases’ (2007) 57 Syracuse L Rev 157. Even today there are no quia timet injunctions for defamation. 
Mitchell, this note, 91. None of this is consistent with idealism. 
91 Nevertheless, one frequently encounters tort cynicism described as ‘loss-based’. See McBride & Bagshaw (3rd 
ed.), n 3 above, 722; McBride & Bagshaw (4th ed), n 3 above, 13–16; Stevens, n 3 above, 20; Goldberg & Zipursky, ‘Torts 
as Wrongs’ n 3 above, 953. 
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conclusory for deciding most of these questions, and that it is broad ‘policy’ considerations that 
determine (more or less consciously) this question.92  
On the question of the difference between cynicism and implications-idealism, the analysis is 
slightly different: implications-idealists think that if an activity is classified as a ‘tort’, the legal 
system should always aim to ensure that the activity in question never occurs. Cynics respond that 
for various reasons this may not always be desirable when the goals of tort law (and other goals 
pursued by society but not through tort law) are taken into account. The implication-idealist accepts 
that policy considerations may be relevant for determining whether something should be a tort, or 
whether a duty of care should be imposed, but then holds that once something has been defined as a 
‘tort’, preventing it from happening is always the best strategy to protecting and promoting the 
values underlying tort law.93 From this we immediately get to the idealist interpretation according to 
which the message by the legal system regarding tort ‘duties’ should always be ‘don’t do it!’  
There are, however, strong reasons for doubting this view. At an abstract level this view has 
the odd implication that the same policy considerations that implications-idealists think are relevant 
for determining what legal rights and duties we have, have no relevance whatsoever in determining 
the optimal way of protecting them. That would be surprising, but it is a view for which 
implications-idealists do not typically offer any argument. There is, however, a more positive case to 
be made for tort cynicism. Idealism is intended to be more than just an attitude: it is said to be a view 
with real-world implications for how tort law actually operates. If this is so, its defenders must take 
into account that maintaining these implications have costs. To be more concrete, for courts to ‘go 
out of their way’ to make sure that torts are not committed, they must do more than merely act, not 
just speak, and acting typically is not without costs.  
Even those who do not think that tort law is concerned with welfare might balk at the law’s 
trying too hard to prevent negligence from occurring in advance, because this may prove too 
intrusive of individual freedom. The cynical approach is more realistic about such cases, because it 
highlights rather than hides the fact that society faces a tragic choice between ‘going out of the way’ 
to prevent torts from happening in advance (with an inevitably larger number of desirable activities 
affected and with less overall freedom) and letting more torts happen and dealing with them only 
after the fact (with fewer curbs on desirable activities and more freedom). It also highlights the fact 
that in that choice society has largely opted for the latter option.  
This presents, as it were, a less cynical view of the cynical view. Tort cynicism on the question 
of remedies is not the view that one can always do whatever one wishes as long as one pays for the 
costs of the activity. It is the view that there is a whole range of responses the law may offer for the 
commission of, or the prospect of, a tort.94 There may be some instances in which tort law will make 
an effort to prevent torts from happening, but in (many) others, it may with good reason prefer a 
                                                                   
92 For a classic statement see O.W. Holmes, Jr., ‘Privilege, Malice, and Intent’ (1894) 8 Harv L Rev 1, 3. I think this 
is the prevailing view these days in the courts, even if it is not always stated quite so explicitly. At times, however, it is, 
e.g. in Dutton v Bognor Regis United Building Co [1972] 1 QB 373, 397; Hercules Management v Ernst & Young [1997] 2 
SCR 165, 187 (‘the term “proximity” itself is nothing more than a label expressing a result’). One factor that is central to 
courts’ reasoning in these questions but that is particularly hard to square with generation-idealism is the prevalence of 
process-based considerations (floodgates, difficulty of proof and so on) in determining the question of duty. See generally 
J.A. Henderson, Jr., ‘Process Constraints in Torts’ (1982) 67 Cornell L Rev 901. 
93 Some generation-idealists balk at the idea that tort law is there to promote any values—it is simply there to 
protect the rights people have—and it is ridiculous to suggest that one really protects those rights when it countenances 
their violation. For reasons I have not space to discuss here, I believe this view is mistaken. In any case, it is irrelevant 
when considering implications-idealism. 
94 On this see also Howarth, n 8 above, 467–468. 
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different response. This may sound odd, but because preventing torts from happening has costs 
(both monetary and non-monetary), there are cases in which it is preferable to have some duties 
breached and some torts happen (and compensated after the fact) than prevent them from 
happening. Sometimes, the downsides of idealism can even be seen within the confines of tort law 
itself. Anyone who thinks it is a virtue of a tort system that it aims that those who have been victims 
of torts are actually compensated, will have to acknowledge that insisting that ‘the person who 
committed [the] tort’ is the one made to pay for it,95 implies fewer people will be compensated.  
It is recognition of this reality that has led cynics to reverse the relationship between rights and 
remedies: not from rights follow remedies, but rather from the scope of remedial protections we learn 
the scope of our legal rights. (Interestingly, this was the common law’s historical attitude to the 
determination of the scope of rights,96 and it was writers influenced by civilian ideas such as William 
Blackstone, John Austin, and more recently Peter Birks, who have argued for its reversal. Despite 
idealists’ claim to adhere to the ‘traditional’ approach of the common law, in this regard the legal 
realist slogan ‘precisely as much right as remedy’97 may actually better reflect that tradition.) One of 
the cynical view’s strengths is that it broadens the scope of remedial responses for the protection of 
legal rights, and encourages the development of new ones, and so, in turn, expands the range of 
types of protected legal rights. The starting point for much of the contemporary discussion is the 
classic article by Calabresi and Melamed. That article proposed a framework for classifying six 
different ways in which a legal system may protect legal entitlements. Two of those were what they 
called ‘inalienability rules’, entitlements that cannot be given up even with their holder’s consent,98 
thus recognising the possibility of legal protection even stronger than the one favoured by idealists. 
They considered two additional rules they called ‘property rules’, i.e. rules that give the entitlement 
holder the power to determine whether to give up their entitlement or not and at what price.99 As it 
happens, Calabresi and Melamed’s starting point was that all entitlements should be protected by 
‘idealist’ property rules, but they noted various reasons why property rule protection might not 
always be possible or desirable.100 Contrary to McBride’s assertion that ‘[t]he only possible reason 
why [injunctions] might be awarded…is that the defendant proposes to commit a civil wrong’,101 
there are many reasons why sometimes injunctions might make sense, even for the cynic.102 That 
                                                                   
95 See note 87. 
96 See e.g. F.W. Maitland, Equity, also The Forms of Action at Common Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1909) 372 (‘This dependence of right upon remedy it is that has given English law that close texture to which it 
owes its continuous existence despite the temptations of Romanism’); cf Davy v Spelthorne Borough Council [1984] AC 
262, 276 (‘typically, English law fastens, not upon principles but upon remedies’). 
97 K.N. Llewellyn, ‘Some Realism about Realism—Responding to Dean Pound’ (1931) 44 Harv L Rev 1222, 1244. 
98 See G. Calabresi & A.D. Melamed, ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One View of the 
Cathedral’ (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089, 1092–1093, 1111–1115.  
99 Ibid 1092.  
100 Ibid 1106–10; see also R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974) ch 4, for a related 
discussion. 
101 McBride & Bagshaw (3rd ed), n 3 above, 722 n 3. The view that cynicism cannot explain injunctions is also 
made in McBride & Bagshaw (4th ed), n 3 above, 14; Goldberg & Zipursky, ‘Torts as Wrongs’, n 3 above, 963. 
102 The question of desirability of property rules is contested among economic-oriented writers, with some favouring 
more use of liability rules while others preferring more property rules, but no economic perspective rules out injunctions. 
For the former view see e.g. L. Kaplow & S. Shavell, ‘Property Rules and Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis’ (1996) 
109 Harv L Rev 713; R.C. Ellickson, ‘Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance Rules, and Fines as Land Use 
Controls’ (1973) 40 U Chi L Rev 681, 738–748. For the latter view see H.E. Smith, ‘Property and Property Rules’ (2004) 
79 NYU L Rev 1719; R.A. Epstein, ‘The Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules’ (1997) 106 Yale 
LJ 2091. Furthermore, among legal economists there is much discussion of the place of ex ante regulation that often 
22 
 
property rules are part of the cynics’ scheme also answers one familiar charge against tort cynicism, 
namely that it cannot explain per se torts like trespass to the person.103 The advantage of the cynical 
view is that it does not treat this question as something to be answered by a priori reasoning on 
‘conceptual’ grounds, but rather seeks to identify the circumstances in which preventing a tort from 
happening will be preferable and those in which it will not. 
Recently, Stephen Smith has offered an argument that might be thought to offer a limited 
response against the problem of the costs of idealism. Smith has argued that it would be good for the 
legal system to always send an idealist (‘don’t do it!’) message even on consequentialist (cynical) 
grounds, because there is empirical evidence that people often obey the law just because it is the law. 
Consequently, merely sending the idealist message is an almost costless way of getting people to 
refrain from undesirable activity.104  
This argument is limited in scope: it does not go as far as to vindicate the claim that courts ‘go 
out of their way’, i.e. act in certain ways, to prevent torts, but if successful, it gives good reason to 
want the legal system to send an idealist message. Unfortunately, even in this limited scope, the 
argument is faulty. To begin, Smith’s empirical claim is questionable. Smith’s claims are based on 
survey data, which is likely, especially in a context such as this, to result in skewed findings. Reality 
shows different behavioural patterns, especially in the area responsible for much tort litigation—
traffic—where law-breaking is rampant. This is hard to reconcile with Smith’s view (mentioned 
above) that the law presently adopts the idealist view.105 One possible reason for this discrepancy 
may be precisely the fact that it is not easy to get the idealist ‘goods’ for free: when people come to 
see that a legal system sending an idealist message does not accompany it by idealist actions, i.e. 
that those who ignore the message are not in any way penalised, the idealist may come to doubt the 
point of her loyalty to the law.  
Second, it is not clear whether an idealist message would always be a good one. Much of 
modern tort liability is focused on torts like nuisance and negligence, which for the most part are 
concerned with undesirable by-products of an otherwise beneficial activity. The message sent by the 
legal system therefore cannot simply be ‘don’t pollute’, but rather ‘don’t pollute (terms and 
conditions apply)’. The problem is that, because of the diversity and complexity of such situations, 
those terms and conditions are difficult to specify in advance. Consequently, a simple and cheap 
message (‘don’t pollute!’) will not necessarily have an overall desirable effect, as it might lead people 
to refrain not just from undesirable activities but also from desirable ones.  
It is illuminating in this context once again to compare tort law with criminal law (or at least 
the part of criminal law concerned with so-called ‘mala in se’ crimes). The paradigmatic mala in se 
crimes—murder, rape, theft, and so on—are activities society wishes to have none of, and as they 
are fairly clearly defined, it is relatively easy to target them. Things are different with negligence, the 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
results in the award of injunction within the legal framework. See S. Shavell, ‘Liability for Harm versus Regulation for 
Safety’ (1984) 13 J Legal Stud 357. 
103 For this claim see Goldberg & Zipursky, ‘Torts as Wrongs’, n 3 above, 954–955; Stevens, n 3 above, 3; McBride 
& Bagshaw (4th ed), n 3 above, 14. I believe reality is more complex even with regard to these torts. See D. Priel, ‘A 
Public Role for the Intentional Torts’ (2011) 22 King’s LJ 183. In any event, the intentional torts are irrelevant to the 
present discussion, which focuses on the question of duty of care within negligence. It is perfectly possible (and consistent 
with the argument in the text) that the law will adopt a cynical approach to some torts and an idealist to others. 
104 S.A. Smith, ‘Duties, Liabilities, and Damages’ (2012) 125 Harv L Rev 1727, 1732–1734. Smith developed this 
argument in a different context, so I cannot be certain he would approve of the way I use it here, but I think it is faithful to 
his overall view of private law as reflected in Smith, n 63 above. 
105 For a challenge to the validity of the conclusions drawn from the studies on which Smith relies see F. Schauer, 
The Force of Law (forthcoming, Harvard University Press, 2014) ch 5. 
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most common form of contemporary tort liability. Sending a message of ‘be careful’, or even a 
somewhat more specific message like ‘don’t commit medical malpractice’ is not going to be much 
help. More significantly, negligently caused harm is typically a side-effect of an otherwise beneficial 
activity.106 We would prefer, of course, to have no medical malpractice, but we recognise that with 
humans being what they are, we cannot (at least for now) have medicine without it. The danger is 
that an idealist message aimed at eliminating the bad (medical malpractice) we will also hinder the 
good (valuable medicine). 
IV. The Broader Significance of this Debate 
I began this essay by warning that the debate between idealists and cynics may appear scholastic 
and irrelevant to real-life concerns. Moreover, I have suggested that it may not matter much what 
people think about tort law, because in practice for the most part, it cannot be anything but cynical. 
If that is the case, what difference does it make what some legal academics think? I wish to conclude 
by explaining why this matters, even in the real-world. Views more-or-less like McBride’s have 
become more prominent in recent years and they often have a similar structure: we are first told on 
conceptual grounds what the real structure of tort law is, from which the theorist then derives 
various normative conclusions. Duty idealism is but one example of this broader attempt to explain 
what tort law is on the basis of conceptual analysis. The problem with this form of argument is that 
its proponents try to win normative victories on the cheap. Instead of arguing, on the basis of 
considerations of justice, fairness, or welfare (or any other normative consideration they believe 
should govern human interactions) on the desirable scope of, say, negligence liability of public 
authorities, or on when liability should be based on fault and when on strict liability, they seek to 
answer these questions by conceptual analysis. In effect they argue, you either have to abolish tort 
law and adopt a New Zealand-style social insurance scheme (something proponents of these 
conceptual arguments invariably oppose) or accept tort law as the conceptualist understands it, 
because that is what tort law truly is.  
One way of challenging this view is to show that the premise on which such arguments rest—
that the current structure of tort law resembles these views—is simply not true. That was one aim of 
this essay. Conceptualists sometimes regretfully concede that tort law as practiced does not actually 
match their account, to which they respond by lamenting judges’ and scholars’ failure to understand 
the True Nature of tort law.107 But this claim rests on the same false dichotomy between ‘real’ tort 
law and no tort law at all. In reality, tort law does not descend on us from heaven to adopt it ‘as is’; it 
is a practice that has been shaped and reshaped by changing societal needs, available technology, 
and political ideologies. Conceptualists are welcome to argue against the expansion of negligence 
liability, but they cannot base their argument on the claim that doing so would ‘twist and distort’ the 
                                                                   
106 To be more precise, there is a tragic choice in the context of criminal law as well, but it often operates somewhat 
differently. In criminal law the worry often is not so much with eliminating a desirable activity, but with the costs 
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activities from happening in advance.  
107 See McBride, n 45 above, 332; E.J. Weinrib, ‘Does Tort Law Have a Future?’ (2000) 34 Val U L Rev 561. 
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law, as if tort law has some fixed nature, set in stone for eternity.108 What they must do is explain 
why such a change would be a ‘twist’ for the worse. Without such an argument the conceptualists’ 
view rests on a non sequitur. For even if we are convinced by conceptualists’ arguments that tort law 
as it currently is concerned with the protection of rights, it does not follow that tort law is necessarily 
concerned only with the protection of rights. There is therefore no incoherence with having some 
torts concerned with the protection of moral rights and other torts concerned with (say) the 
promotion of welfare, equality, or any other social goal. There is also no incoherence in saying that 
though tort law used to be concerned with rights, such a conception is simply incapable of dealing 
with the problems of contemporary society (large-scale risks, many interactions among strangers, 
new technologies), and so it has (to be) changed to accommodate these problems.  
This highlights one of the more pernicious problems with conceptualism, namely that by 
presenting its arguments as conceptual, it obscures the real matters at stake. In a recent essay 
McBride denied the charge that conceptualism is motivated by a certain political outlook, saying 
that ‘there is nothing distinctively left-wing or right-wing in recognising that there are limits to what 
we should be allowed to do to each other, and allowed to refuse to do for each other’.109 That may be 
so, but it is also true that people of different political persuasions strongly disagree on where those 
limits should be placed, a debate that is completely obscured by conceptual claims about what tort 
law really is. Proof of this is found on the very same page of McBride’s essay: properly understood, 
he says, tort law is inconsistent with ‘collective goals’. For those concerned that tort law 
conceptualism hides the normative issues at stake, such a statement will confirm their worries with a 
vengeance. Many critics of the shape of certain tort doctrines presently say that right now the law is 
often structured in such a way that it favours certain values or groups; they then proceed to argue 
why and how the law should be reformed to address this problem. McBride’s response is, in effect, 
that such critics are correct—tort law is indeed inconsistent with certain goals—but because of 
what tort law ‘genuinely’110 is, there is nothing (short of abolishing tort law) that can be done about 
it!  
It is here, I think, that one can see the most fundamental difference between cynicism and 
idealism. The cynical view insists that very few of the questions about the foundations of tort law 
can be answered by appeal to what a certain concept—be it tort law, negligence, right, duty, or 
wrong—‘genuinely’ is. It insists that such questions are primarily normative questions, and that it 
is our normative answers to these questions that shapes our legal concepts, not the other way 
around. If this is called ‘cynicism’, so be it. 
                                                                   
108 See note 45 and accompanying text. This is not merely an academic concern. Arguments of this sort were 
prominent in the opposition to suggestions to reform the law on negligence liability of public authorities. See Law 
Commission, Administrative Redress: Public Bodies and the Citizen (No 322, 2010) 8–9. 
109 McBride, n 45 above, 361.  
110 Ibid 365. 
